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INTRODUCTION
If you happen to use one of the 200 million1 iPhone, iPad, and
iPod touch devices on the planet, Apple knows where you are.
Tucked away in a file2 on every user‘s device is a regularly
updated list of location-based information.3 Apple claims that it
uses that information to improve the response time of software that
requires a user‘s location.4 But that sensitive information is not
kept secret.5 The list of a user‘s locations is stored in an
unprotected, unencrypted file, open to every application on a user‘s
iOS6 device.7
Apple has since updated its software to reduce the amount of
location-based information it stores and to give users more control
over how their information is used.8 While that change is
1

See Graham Spencer, Over 200 Million iOS Devices Sold, 25 Million iPads and $2.5
Billion Paid to Developers, MACSTORIES, http://www.macstories.net/news/over-200million-ios-devices-sold-25-million-ipads-and-2-5-billion-paid-to-developers/
(last
visited Sept. 8, 2011).
2
The file, called consolidated.db, was discovered by two hackers in the Spring of
2011. See Nick Bilton, 3G Apple iOS Devices Are Storing Users‟ Location Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/3g-apple-iosdevices-secretly-storing-users-location/ [hereinafter Bilton, 3G Devices].
3
See id. See also Nick Bilton, Apple Updates Software to Fix Problems With
Collecting Location Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011, 3:42 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/05/04/apple-ios-software-release-fixes-location-bug/ [hereinafter Bilton, Apple
Updates Software] (noting that a problem with Apple‘s mobile devices enabled them to
collect customers‘ locations).
4
See Bilton, Apple Updates Software, supra note 3.
5
See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.
6
iOS is Apple‘s mobile operating system which runs on the iPhone, iPad and iPod
touch. See iOS 4.3 Software Update, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ios/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2011).
7
See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.
8
See Bilton, Apple Updates Software, supra note 3.
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beneficial for Apple‘s users, it was a business decision.9 Apple
was not obligated to change its policy. It was not in violation of
any law.10
Apple‘s location-storing episode highlights a gap that exists in
current privacy law. The smartphone,11 a cell phone with PC-like
functionality, has made it possible for users to turn their current
location into a practical tool.12 Smartphone applications, called
location-based mobile services (LBMS),13 are designed to facilitate
this new functionality. These applications, however, operate in a
largely unregulated space. Courts that are forced to deal with
mobile privacy issues are left with a statute that was drafted in
1986,14 years before the Internet took off15 and the smartphone was
first introduced.16 In many cases, actions that intuitively seem

9
Apple‘s decision to change how iOS stores user information was part of a public
relations campaign to appease users after it was discovered that users‘ locations were
being stored. See AppleInsider Staff, Apple Releases iOS 4.3.3 with Fixes for Location
Database Controversy, APPLEINSIDER (May 4, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.appleinsider.
com/articles/11/05/04/apple_releases_ios_4_3_3_with_fixes_for_location_database_
controversy.html. The proposed changes, along with answers to other questions, were
provided in a press release shortly after the consolidated.db file was discovered. See
Apple Q&A On Location Data, APPLE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html; Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.
10
See Karen Gullo, Apple Sued Over User Location Data Storage on IPhones, IPads,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0425/apple-sued-over-user-location-data-storage-on-iphones-ipads.html.
11
The smartphone as a class includes iPhones, Blackberries, and other Android OSenabled devices. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 FCC Rcd. 11407, 11412 (2010).
There were approximately 78.2 million smartphone devices in the United States as of
June 2011. See 50 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASS‘N (June 2011),
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10378.
12
This is not to imply that a message will be received or read by the entire Internet.
Rather that a public message, like a tweet, is accessible by everyone with an Internet
connection.
13
See GSM Ass‘n, Permanent Reference Document SE.23: Location Based Services,
GSM WORLD, 11 (2003), http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/se23.pdf [hereinafter
Location Based Services].
14
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986).
15
For example, current privacy law would apply differently to a phone call transmitted
digitally and one transmitted over copper wires. See infra Part III.B.
16
The first smartphone was the IBM Simon, created in 1992. BUSINESS2COMMUNITY,
A Look Back in Time at the First Smartphone Ever, BUSINESS2COMMUNITY.COM (June
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wrong, like Apple‘s secret storing of a user‘s location, simply do
not fall within the scope of existing privacy law. Furthermore,
actions that do come within the language of existing regulations
are resolved in ways that do not take into consideration the current
state of technology or how it is used by the public.
This Note addresses the need to build a regulatory system that
can correctly deal with location-based mobile information. Part I
describes the current status of the technology industry and outlines
what information software developers can currently access from a
user‘s device. Part II examines the statute regulating this area, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and points out
some of the problems courts face when applying it to cases that
deal with information privacy. Part III highlights where the
application of this regime produces conflicting results. Lastly, Part
IV examines changes to the ECPA that will bring it up to speed
with modern uses of technology, and suggests why proposed
legislation does not go far enough to make a substantial change.
I. WHAT THEY KNOW ABOUT YOU
LBMSs are third-party applications commonly known as apps.
Smartphone users download these apps from the Internet and
install them onto their devices.17 The process is similar to
downloading and installing software onto a computer. Once
installed, the LBMS purportedly uses a person‘s current location to
perform useful functions18—anything from providing directions to

27, 2011), http://www.business2community.com/mobile-apps/a-look-back-in-time-at-thefirst-smartphone-ever-040906.
17
Users can download applications either directly from a third-party‘s website or from
a digital ―app store,‖ a specialized application or website that facilitates this type of
content delivery. App stores are usually preinstalled by the phone manufacturer on a
given device. The largest marketplace for these ―apps‖ is the iTunes app store operated
by Apple. See Apple Introduces the New iPhone 3G, APPLE (June 9, 2008),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/06/09Apple-Introduces-the-New-iPhone-3G.html.
At the time of the writing of this note there are over 300,000 apps available for download
onto the iPhone alone. See Federico Viticci, How Many iPhone Apps Are There? 306,554
– And 60,000 iPad Apps, MACSTORIES.NET (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.macstories.net/
news/how-many-iphone-apps-are-there-306554-and-60000-ipad-apps/.
18
See Location Based Services, supra note 13, at 11.
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There are

Just like any other piece of software, installing an LBMS
requires that a user agree to certain conditions.20 These conditions
may be agreed to at the initial installation of the app or later on
during its use.21 The terms a user agrees to control not only the use
of the app but also the application‘s use of the information stored
on the device.22 Once an LBMS makes its way on to a user‘s
device it often has access to a wealth of information beyond what a
user provides23—particularly with regard to location-based
information.
A. Location-Based Information
One class of LBMS facilitates a user‘s choice to share his
current location with others. How each application achieves this
goal varies. For example, ―check in‖ applications like foursquare24
or Gowalla25 encourage users to share their location with friends
by ―checking in‖ at a specific place.26 This ―check-in‖ often links

19

For example, mobile apps may be used for social networking, booking a vacation,
sharing photographs, or many other including ones that are constantly being developed.
See, e.g., Doug Gross, New Wave of Location-Based Apps Mark a „Paradigm Shift,‟
CNN (June 29, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-29/tech/discovery.apps_1_
android-free-app-hipstamatic?_s=PM:TECH.
20
Computer software commonly prompts users upon installation to agree or disagree
with certain conditions known as the End User License Agreement. See, e.g., Specht v.
Netscape Commc‘ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff‟d, 306 F.3d 17
(2d Cir. 2002) (describing an End User License Agreement as ―the contract allegedly
made by the offeror of the software and the party effecting the download‖). On the
Android app marketplace, for example, users are prompted prior to downloading and
installing an app of the permissions that are required for that app to run. If a user does
not agree to the conditions, he is not allowed to install the app. See Frank McPherson,
Android App Permissions Explained, SOCIALTIMES (July 29, 2010, 9:42 PM), http://social
times.com/android-app-permissions-explained_b47761.
21
See infra Part I.C.
22
See Application Licensing, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com
/guide/publishing/licensing.html (last visited Sept.12, 2011).
23
See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24
See FOURSQUARE, www.foursquare.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
25
See GOWALLA, www.gowalla.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
26
Shane Snow, Foursquare vs. Gowalla: Location-Based Throwdown, MASHABLE
(Dec. 25, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/12/25/foursquare-gowalla/.
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to other social networks27 and rewards a user for his continued
participation.28 This reward practice is utilized by start-up
companies and by subdivisions of larger, well-established, social
networks, like Facebook.29 The rewards encourage users to share
their location with their friends more frequently, thereby using the
app, the company‘s product, more frequently.
Apps that do not use a ―check in‖ model automatically
broadcast a user‘s location to others within the application.30
Google Latitude31 (―Latitude‖), for example, is primarily an
extension of the mapping program Google Maps.32 Latitude
allows users to share their current location with existing contacts.33
Unlike the ―check in‖ model which broadcasts a message to a
user‘s existing network, Latitude displays a user‘s location on a

27
Linking to social networks drastically increases the overall effect of each individual
check in by spreading that information to a larger number of users. The average user on
Facebook has 130 friends. See Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press
/info.php?statistics (last visited Dec. 3, 2010); cf. Primates on Facebook: Even Online the
Neocortex is the Limit, ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2009) http://www.economist.com/
node/13176775?story_id=13176775 (noting that while the average Facebook user has
120 friends, the maximum number is set by biological factors). But see Cameron Marlow,
Maintained Relationships on Facebook, OVERSTATED (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://overstated.net/2009/03/09/maintained-relationships-on-facebook.
28
On foursquare, the user who ―checks in‖ at any given location the most is deemed
the ―mayor‖ of that location. What is a Foursquare “Mayor”?, FOURSQUARE,
http://support.foursquare.com/entries/188303-what-is-a-foursquare-mayor (last visited
Sept. 11, 2011). Many businesses offer special deals or savings to the mayor of that
location. See Robert Gembarski, FourSquare: Unlock Check-In Specials, BRANDING
PERSONALITY (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.brandingpersonality.com/foursquare-unlockcheck-in-specials/. Furthermore, users who hold ten mayorships at once receive a
―badge‖ on their profiles that designates them as a ―Super Mayor.‖ The Full List of
Foursquare Badges, 4SQUAREBADGES.COM, http://www.4squarebadges.com/foursquarebadge-list/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
29
See Josh Constine, Facebook Testing Places Check-In Incentive Deals and Rewards,
INSIDE FACEBOOK (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/10/28/placescheck-in-deals-rewards/.
30
See Jennifer Van Grove, iPhone App Uses Background Location for Automatic
Checkins on Foursquare, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010
/08/25/checkmate-for-foursquare/.
31
See Google Latitude, GOOGLE MOBILE, http://www.google.com/mobile/latitude/ (last
visited Dec. 3, 2010).
32
See generally Google Maps, GOOGLE, http://maps.google.com (last visited Sept. 13,
2011).
33
See Google Latitude, supra note 31.
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map to friends they select from their existing contact list.34 Other
mobile apps mimic this mapping function and combine it with
additional features. Apps like Friends Around,35 for example, use
a hybrid model that combines reward-based ―check ins‖ with
Latitude-like visualization.36
B. Determining A User‟s Location
No matter which model an app uses, a LBMS can determine a
user‘s current location in four ways: (1) using Global Positioning
Service (―GPS‖);37 (2) using the user‘s unique Cell-ID;38 (3)
tracking the user‘s Internet connection if he has access to Wi-Fi;39
and (4) allowing the user to specify his current location.40 Since
the fourth option is user-controlled, only releasing location
information specified by the user, this note will focus exclusively
on the first three methods.41
1. GPS
GPS is the most accurate way to determine a user‘s location.42
GPS locates each user through a process called trilateration,43
which uses twenty-seven satellites in orbit above the Earth to plot
34

Id.
See FRIENDS AROUND, http://friendsaround.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
36
See Zila Networks Raises the Social Standard with „Friends Around Me‟ Mobile
Application for the iPhone, PRWEB (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/
Friends-Around-Me/mobile-social-network/prweb3868854.htm.
37
See Obtaining User Location, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/
guide/topics/location/obtaining-user-location.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
38
Shu Wang, Jungwon Min & Byung K. Yi, Location Based Services for Mobiles:
Technologies and Standards, LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM, 21 (2008), http://bluepenguin.org/cache/location-based-services-for-mobiles.pdf.
39
See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37.
40
See Sarah Perez, Google Latitude iPhone App Revealed: Should You Use It?,
READWRITEWEB (Dec. 8, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
google_latitude_iphone_app_spotted.php.
41
Keep in mind that a location based mobile service has access to whichever of these
methods is available on a given device. When one is unavailable, another may be used.
See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37; see also Location and my Privacy FAQ,
WINDOWS PHONE, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsphone/en-us/howto/wp7/web/
location-and-my-privacy.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
42
See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37.
43
See Tracy V. Wilson, How GPS Phones Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics.
howstuffworks.com/gps-phone.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
35
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the intersection of at least three spheres drawn around the user and
three satellites to determine his exact position on the ground.44
Although extremely accurate, GPS suffers from several limitations.
First, it is slow, and can sometimes take minutes to return a
result.45 Second, it is processor-intensive and will quickly drain a
phone‘s battery.46 Third, it is most effective when the user is
outdoors.47 Because of these limitations, GPS is not always the
most practical way to determine a user‘s location.48
2. The Cell-ID Method
The Cell-ID49 method is less accurate than GPS, but more
versatile.50 This process uses a carrier‘s cell network, not
satellites, to determine a user‘s location.51 Conceptually, the CellID method is much simpler than GPS. Every cell phone on a given
network is assigned a unique identification number.52 When a
user‘s phone is on, that phone will connect to the nearest cell tower
to establish a connection.53 By searching for a specific ID number
it is possible to identify the tower to which a given device is

44

See id.
See Using Geolocation, MOZILLA DEVELOPER NETWORK, https://developer.mozilla
.org/En/Using_geolocation (last modified Aug. 12, 2011) (explaining that GPS can take a
minute or more to fix a user‘s location, but that less accurate information like his IP
address may be returned faster).
46
See Adroit Allen, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Dedicated GPS vs A
Smart Phone GPS, HUBPAGES, http://adroitalien.hubpages.com/hub/The-Benefits-Of-ADedicated-GPS-vs-A-Smart-Phone-GPS 78 (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
47
See Wilson, supra note 43 (explaining how GPS locates a cell phone).
48
Apple explained that the inability to reliably track user location is one of the reasons
it needed to store user location data. Capturing that information was justified because it
improved the performance of certain mobile apps. See Apple Q&A On Location Data,
supra note 9.
49
See Wang, supra note 38, at 21.
50
See Adding Location to a Non GPS Phone: Introducing CellID, MOBIFORGE, http://
mobiforge.com/developing/story/adding-location-a-non-gps-phone-introducing-cellid
(last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See id.
45
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connected.54 Because the tower is fixed, the location of the tower
will reveal the location of the user.55
The Cell-ID method has benefited from the explosion of the
cell phone industry.56 There are now over 251,000 reported cell
sites in the United States, compared to the 913 that existed the year
before the ECPA was passed.57 The proliferation of cell sites is
directly related to the increase in the number of cell phone users.58
As the density of cell phone users in an area grows, the only way
for a carrier to accommodate the increased number of customers is
to divide that area into smaller and smaller sectors.59 Carriers then
ensure that there is enough bandwidth to service the user base in
that area by supplying each sector with its own tower.60 The
smaller a sector is or the more towers there are, the more
accurately an individual can be located.61 Currently, carriers
commonly use ―microcells,‖ towers with a range of forty feet.62
The Cell-ID method will become even more accurate over time as
the range each tower covers decreases.
Cell-ID location has also benefited from the rise of technology,
making it possible to locate a user within any given sector,
irrespective of the sector‘s size.63 A user within range of multiple

54

See id.
Cell phone towers, like Wi-Fi networks, cover a certain distance. If a user is
connected to a tower, it is certain then that he is located somewhere within that tower‘s
covered range. See id.
56
The number of cell phone towers has tripled over the last decade. See In re U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
57
See id.
58
To keep up with the demand for mobile data usage at broadband speeds, more
towers need to be installed. See The FCC Says the U.S. Needs More Cell Phone Towers,
WIRELESS INDUS. NEWS (June 28, 2011), http://www.wirelessindustrynews.org/news-jun2011/2581-062811-win-news.html; Dawn Kawamoto, The Incredible, Shrinking Cell
Phone Tower: Alcatel-Lucent Offers an Alternative, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 22, 2011, 6:00
AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/03/22/the-incredible-shrinking-cellphone-tower
-alcatel-lucent-offers/; LTE Cell Phone Tower Industry Growth, DEADZONES.COM (Apr.
7, 2010), http://www.deadzones.com/2010/04/cell-phone-tower-industry-growth. html.
59
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
60
See id. (explaining that the rise of 3G technology is also increasing this demand).
61
See id. at 833.
62
See id.
63
Id.
55
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towers can be located using triangulation.64 The process is similar
to the trilateration method used by GPS, but relies on the overlap
of signals in space rather than on the ground.65 By correlating the
time and angle at which a phone‘s signal arrives at multiple base
stations, the carrier can determine a user‘s location within fifty
meters or less.66
3. Wi-Fi Geolocation
Wi-Fi geolocation has been available since at least 200867 and
it is becoming even more useful as the number of smartphones
increases.68 Building off of the Google Gears geolocation project,
the World Wide Web Consortium69 (―W3C‖) released a
geolocation application programming interface (―API‖) in
February of 2010.70
The Wi-Fi method of geolocation uses various location-based
clues to determine the location from which a user is currently
accessing the web.71 These ―clues‖ include information gathered
from the media access control (―MAC‖) address of other available
Wi-Fi networks, cell towers, Bluetooth MAC address, radiofrequency identifier (―RFID‖), Cell-ID, and GPS signal.72 By
collecting and storing this information, namely the MAC
64

See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
65
See Chris Smith, Cell Phone Triangulation Accuracy Is All Over The Map, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (Sept. 28, 2008, 4:59 PM), http://searchengineland.com/cell-phonetriangulation-accuracy-is-all-over-the-map-14790.
66
Emerging versions of this technology promise to be more accurate. See In re U.S.
for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
67
See Charles Wiles, Introducing the Gears Geolocation API for All Laptop WiFi
Users, GOOGLE CODE BLOG (Oct. 21, 2008), http://googlecode.blogspot.com/2008
/10/introducing-gears-geolocation-api-for.html.
68
See generally Marguerite Reardon & Tom Krazit, Google: Oops, We Spied On Your
Wi-Fi, CNET NEWS (May 14, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_320005051-266.html.
69
See About W3C, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
70
See Geolocation API Specification: Editor‟s Draft 10 February 2010, W3C (Feb.
10, 2010), http://dev.w3.org/geo/api/spec-source.html (providing a simple or less
technical description of the API); see also W3C Geolocation API, WEBSCANNOTES,
http://webscannotes.com/?page_id=425 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
71
See W3C Geolocation API, supra note 70.
72
See id.
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addresses73 of other Wi-Fi networks, the W3C API can build a
profile for each location.74 As more information is gathered, it is
possible to pinpoint a user‘s location at any given time.75 While
very few mobile browsers currently support the W3C API, the
number is rising and will likely continue to increase.
C. Access To Information Stored On Your Device
LBMS do more than collect location-based data. Each app a
user chooses to install on his smartphone can access different
information stored on that device.76 This access, however, is never
unlimited.77 The level of access granted to each application is
73

See IEEE Computer Soc‘y, 802 IEEE Standards For Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks: Overview and Architecture, INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG‘RS, 20 (2002),
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802-2001.pdf, (―The concept of universal
addressing is based on the idea that all potential members of a network need to have a
unique identifier (if they are going to coexist in the network).‖).
74
See Geolocation API Specification: Editor‟s Draft 10 February 2010, supra note 70.
75
See Wi-Fi Based Real-Time Location Tracking: Solutions and Technology, CISCO
SYSTEMS, 1–4 (2006), http://www.techrepublic.com/whitepapers/wi-fi-based-real-timelocation-tracking-solutions-and-technology/283735 (explaining how Wi-Fi geolocation
works, specifically that the calculation of a user‘s location will be more refined if there is
more information available).
76
While no application can access user information automatically, each application
has access to the data that it pulls into its ―sandbox.‖ iOS Application Programming
Guide: The Application Runtime Environment, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/library/
ios/#documentation/iphone/conceptual/iphoneosprogrammingguide/RuntimeEnvironment
/RuntimeEnvironment.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2011). ―The sandbox is a set of finegrained controls limiting an application‘s access to files, preferences, network resources,
hardware, and so on. Each application has access to the contents of its own sandbox but
cannot access other applications‘ sandboxes.‖ Id. The data that makes it into the sandbox
is normally defined by user permissions. See, e.g., id.; Security and Permissions,
ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/security.html
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011).
77
See, e.g., supra note 76 (―A central design point of the Android security architecture
is that no application, by default, has permission to perform any operations that would
adversely impact other applications, the operating system, or the user. This includes
reading or writing the user‘s private data (such as contacts or e-mails), reading or writing
another application‘s files, performing network access, keeping the device awake, etc.
An application‘s process runs in a security sandbox. The sandbox is designed to prevent
applications from disrupting each other, except by explicitly declaring the permissions
they need for additional capabilities not provided by the basic sandbox. The system
handles requests for permissions in various ways, typically by automatically allowing or
disallowing based on certificates or by prompting the user. The permissions required by
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determined by a set of controls called ―permissions.‖78
Applications do not have access to any user information by default,
and can only access whatever the ―permissions‖ allow them to.79
These restraints can be defined either at the installation of the
application by a traditional ―clickwrap‖ license,80 or later on
throughout the use of the application by user prompts.81 The type
of permission required depends on the information being sought by
the application and varies according to the phone‘s operating
system.82
Permissions are important because a user-defined permission is
evidence that a user consents to the application accessing that
data.83 In an attempt to gain permission most privacy policies
an application are declared statically in that application, so they can be known up-front at
install time and will not change after that.‖).
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
See Feldman v. Google Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (―A
clickwrap agreement appears on an internet webpage and requires that a user consent to
any terms or conditions by clicking on a dialog box on the screen in order to proceed with
the internet transaction.‖); see also Ed Bayley, The Clicks That Bind: Ways Users
“Agree” to Online Terms of Service, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2009),
http://www.eff.org/wp/clicks-bind-ways-users-agree-online-terms-service.
81
For example, an application that wants to access your GPS data can satisfy the
above requirement by: (1) including as part of a general term of service agreement that
you allow them to access your location data at all times or; (2) prompting the user with a
question, similar to ―do you want to allow X to access your location,‖ that governs what
the application is allowed to do. Following these procedures, an application can access
any of the information it wants on a user‘s device, contacts, e-mails, etc., as long as it
makes sure it secures permission first. See Katherine Noyes, Why Android App Security is
Better Than for the iPhone, PC WORLD BUS. CTR. (Aug. 6, 2010, 4:20 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/202758/why_android_app_security_is_be
tter_than_for_the_iphone.html; see also About Permissions for Third-Party Applications,
BLACKBERRY,
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/deliverables/22178/
About_permissions_for_third-party_apps_50_778147_11.jsp (last visited Sept. 29, 2011);
Security and Permissions, supra note 76.
82
See Security and Permissions, supra note 76; Security Overview, APPLE, 47 (June 7,
2011),
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Ove
rview/Security_Overview.pdf; BlackBerry Smartphones: UI Guidelines Version 6.0,
BLACKBERRY (Nov. 22, 2010), http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/subcategories
/?userType=21&category=Java+Development+Guidelines.
83
See infra Part II. Every application gains the consent necessary to access user
information in a different way. For example, Google Maps uses a traditional clickwrap
structure that requires the user to agree to a list of terms and conditions when the program
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inform users about: (1) the type of information collected; and (2)
the purpose for collecting that information.84 Applications tend to
define the type of data broadly in an attempt to strike a balance
between providing enough information so that application may
gain consent to access a user‘s data85 and being broad enough to
avoid ruling out specific information.86 Similarly the purpose of
the data acquisition is also very broad. For example, a privacy
policy may state that user data can be collected for anything related
to ―improving the content of the Service.‖87 As the scope of
―improving the content of the Service‖ is never defined, any usage

is initially launched. Peter S. Vogel, A Worrisome Truth: Internet Privacy is Impossible,
TECHNEWSWORLD (June 8, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/
story/72610.html. Foursquare, on the other hand, embeds its terms in a privacy policy
posted on its website, and not within the app. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
84
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com/legal/privacy (last
updated Jan. 12, 2011) (―Personal Information You Provide to Us: We receive and store
any information you enter on our Service or provide to us in any other way. The types of
Personal Information collected may include your name, email address, phone number,
birthday, Twitter and/or Facebook usernames, use information regarding your use of our
Service and browser information. We automatically receive your location when you use
the Service. The Personal Information you provide is used for such purposes as allowing
you to set up a user account and profile that can be used to interact with other users
through the Service, improving the content of the Service, customizing the advertising
and content you see, and communicating with you about specials and new features. We
may also draw upon this Personal Information in order to adapt the Services of our
community to your needs, to research the effectiveness of our network and Services, and
to develop new tools for the community.‖).
85
See Security and Permissions, supra note 76.
86
See id. Looking more closely at the foursquare example, users consent to the
collection of information they ―enter on our service‖ along with anything they ―provide . .
. in any other way.‖ See Privacy Policy, supra note 84. What ―other way‖ someone
might provide data to that service is not clear. The privacy policy only states that the
application may collect ―browser information.‖ See id. What exactly is included in
―browser information‖ remains unknown.
87
See Privacy Policy, supra note 84. Foursquare amended its privacy policy on
December 2, 2010 to clarify what it was automatically collecting. However, this does not
change value of the above example with regard to other policies. See id. (―Information
Collected Automatically: When you use the Service, foursquare automatically receives
and records information on our server logs from your browser or mobile platform,
including your location, IP address, cookie information, and the page you requested. We
treat this data as non-Personal Information, except where we are required to do otherwise
under applicable law.‖).
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category.88

II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF MOBILE PRIVACY REGULATION
Currently there is no statute specifically regulating access to
user data.89 Instead this information is governed by statutes
regulating electronic communication90 such as the ECPA.91 The
ECPA was enacted to extend the protections of the Federal
Wiretap Act92 to electronic communications.93 It addresses three
types of intrusive conduct: the intercepting of live communication,
the accessing of stored communications, and the recording of
―non-content‖ information.94 These three categories are reflected
in the three titles of the ECPA: Title I–Interception of
Communications and Related Matters, which regulates access to
live communications; Title II–Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications and Transactional Records Access (herein
―SCA‖), which deals exclusively with access to communications in
storage;95 and Title III – Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices

88

Providing information to third-party retailers might make the service better, just as
monitoring a user‘s location to ensure he arrives home safely could as well. As it is
currently drafted, the boundaries are unclear.
89
For examples of proposed legislation, see Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance
Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011); Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223,
112th Cong. (2011); Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility
Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards
Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010).
90
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining ―electronic communication‖ as ―any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce‖).
91
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
92
The Federal Wiretap Act was codified at the same time as Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
93
S. Rep. No. 99-F541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
94
See id. at 3557, 3600.
95
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006)).

LEVIS (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/12/2011 2:00 PM

MIXED SIGNALS IN MOBILE PRIVACY

205

(―the Pen Register Statute‖), which sets limitations on the access to
non-content information.96
Each of the ECPA‘s three titles has its own standard that
controls access to communications within that class. Title I, which
modified the Federal Wiretap Act, utilizes the highest standard. It
requires that the government obtain a warrant, upon a showing of
probable cause that the information to be seized is evidence of a
crime.97 Title II, the SCA, uses a lower standard. Under the SCA,
the government need only show ―specific and articulable facts‖
that the stored information sought is ―relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.‖98 Lastly, if the information
sought falls under Title III, the Pen Register Statute, the
government may obtain a court order for the installation of a pen
register device upon mere ―certification‖ that the information
sought is ―relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.‖99
Under this three-tiered structure, how a piece of information is
treated depends on how it is classified. The dividing line between
Titles I, II and III is designed to mirror the amount of privacy an
individual can reasonably expect in communications that fall
within each class.100 Understanding what courts consider a
reasonable expectation of privacy is the first step in understanding
the ECPA‘s overall structure.

96

Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2006)).
97
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info., 497
F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (D.P.R. 2007); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (the traditional
warrant requirement).
98
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device,
& for Geographic Location Info., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
99
18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
100
See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 8,
2010) (―Courts, however, have long held that different communications hardware and
technologies carry different reasonable expectations of privacy.‖).
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A. Katz and the Expectation of Privacy in Electronic
Communications
Much of our modern conception of privacy is grounded in the
Fourth Amendment‘s mandate that individuals ―shall be secure in
their person, houses, papers and effects‖ from unreasonable
government intrusion.101 Though it may sound like a blanket grant
of protection, the scope of the Fourth Amendment is actually
limited. Katz v. United States,102 a wiretap case, established that
people are protected from unwarranted government intrusion only
in situations where: (1) they have a subjective expectation of
privacy; and (2) that expectation is one society is prepared to
recognize as ―reasonable.‖103
Since only ―reasonable‖
expectations of privacy will be honored, for information to receive
protection it must meet this threshold.
Applying the Katz test to modern communications is often a
multi-step process. Most communications can be broken down
into component parts, each of which must be addressed separately
within the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.104 For
example, a landline phone call can be split into two pieces, the
number dialed and the conversation that follows. As each of these
contains distinct information, the level of privacy an individual can
reasonably expect will be different for each component.105
In following this method, ECPA treats the phone number and
conversation differently. The phone number receives very little
protection.106 The conversation however, is almost sacred.107
Because the level of privacy one expects in the content of the
phone call is much higher, Title I of ECPA requires a warrant
before law enforcement can gain access to a phone conversation.108
101

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
103
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
104
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
105
Id. at 742.
106
See id. (explaining that phone numbers are subject to less protection because ―we
doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers
they dial.‖).
107
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (explaining that an individual is ―entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted.‖).
108
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006).
102
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Compared to the mere ―certification‖ law enforcement needs to
access a phone number under Title III, 109 the difference is
considerable.
In many situations, however, the dividing line is not so clear.
The Katz test recognizes that not all communications within the
same class should be entitled to the same expectation of privacy.110
Instead, a factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding how a
method of communication is used is often warranted.111 However,
regardless of where something falls within the ECPA, individuals
lose any reasonable expectation of privacy they may have in
information that is knowingly disclosed to the public.112 In a
mobile app context, this means that once an individual chooses to
disclose certain information to an application by accepting a
requested permission, he loses whatever expectation of privacy he
may have previously had. Once a permission is accepted, it does
not matter whether a user believes his information is not public.
Even if a subjective expectation of privacy previously existed, that
expectation becomes less reasonable once that information is
public.113 In this way privacy after Katz takes into consideration
the level of access of each piece of information. Courts charged
with applying the test must distinguish between situations in which
the same method of communication was used differently.114
Since a government intrusion must infringe on both an
individual‘s subjective expectation of privacy and one society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable, how ―private‖ (or public) an
individual thinks he has made his activity is not dispositive.115 The
109

Id. § 3122(b)(2).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.5.
111
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (―Fourth
Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant
generalizations.‖ (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5
(1986))).
112
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (―What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‖).
113
See id.
114
For example a cell phone conversation that takes place in a closed telephone booth
may be treated differently than one that occurs on a crowded city bus. See id. at 351.
115
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (―[T]he test of legitimacy is not
whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity, but instead whether
the government‘s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by
110
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societal expectation also has value.116 Thus, if society considers
something to be private, it is likely that an individual would be
justified in expecting privacy in that instance. This concept is
critical to a court‘s understanding of a new technology because
there is no established precedent to guide its analysis.
Society‘s expectation of privacy is higher when dealing with a
new technology that is not ―generally available to the public.‖117
The Supreme Court has addressed a range of new technologies
over time, from aerial mapping cameras118 to thermal imaging
devices.119 In each case, the Court has assessed the reasonableness
of an individual‘s expectation of privacy by looking at how
accessible that technology was to the general public.120 In this
context, access to the technology is directly related to the ability to
access certain information. Arguably, the more common a
technology is, the more likely it is to be used to collect
information, and therefore the less reasonable it is for one to expect
that his actions will remain hidden.121
the Fourth Amendment.‖ (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
116
Many cases in which the defendants have done everything possible to conceal their
behavior are still decided against an expectation of privacy. See id. at 211–13 (―It can
reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop
from at least street-level views. . . . Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from
the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on top of a truck or two-level bus.‖); see also
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 241 (1986) (―Short of erecting a roof
over the Midland complex, Dow has, as the Court states, undertaken ‗elaborate‘
precautions to secure the facility from unwelcome intrusions.‖).
117
See Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238.
118
Id. at 231.
119
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
120
Id. at 34 (―We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.‖); see also Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at
231 (―The photographs at issue in this case are essentially like those commonly used in
mapmaking. Any person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate
them.‖); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (―In an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana
plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an
altitude of 1,000 feet.‖).
121
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (―[T]he technology enabling human flight has exposed to
public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the
house and its curtilage that once were private.‖). But see Dow Chem. 476 U.S. at 238
(―[S]urveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
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This analysis also cuts the other way. Revealing something to
the public ordinarily subjects it to a lower expectation of privacy.
However, when technology is involved in data collection, one must
also examine the method of surveillance under the general
accessibility standard.122 Therefore, in this context, the use of
certain technology may create a reasonable expectation of privacy
where one previously would not have reasonably expected it.123
This ―method of surveillance‖ standard, as applied to modern
technology, is derived from Kyllo v. United States.124 In Kyllo, law
enforcement used a thermal imaging device to observe the relative
heat levels inside a house.125 While the information they collected,
thermal radiation, was publicly available, the technology they used
was not.126 Were the traditional Katz rational to apply, this public
information would not be subject to any reasonable expectation of
privacy.127 The Court, however, focused instead on the technology
used to collect that information. It reasoned that even if Kyllo
could expect that the heat leaving his house was public, he would
not reasonably expect that a thermal imager would be waiting
outside.128
The import of Kyllo is that the use of technology during
surveillance may weaken or reverse the effect of public disclosure
under the Katz analysis. Society may not justifiably impose a
lower expectation of privacy on a communication simply because
it was made in a public place.129 The method of surveillance and

not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.‖).
122
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (―It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance
of technology.‖).
123
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238 (suggesting that the ―use of highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant‖); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (―But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.‖ (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960))).
124
533 U.S. at 34.
125
Id. at 30.
126
Id. at 34.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Cf. id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).

LEVIS (DO NOT DELETE)

210

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/12/2011 2:00 PM

[Vol. 22:191

how that public information was collected are equally important.130
Location is only one factor in the analysis.
This modification to the Katz standard is extremely important
in the context of mobile privacy. Just as a landline phone call can
be divided into two components,131 mobile communications may
be subdivided into smaller parts as well. The data stream from a
cell phone may contain many different types of information. It
may contain audio from a phone call, e-mail, and data related to a
user‘s current location.132 Following an application of the hybrid
Katz/Kyllo test, the reasonable expectation of privacy in each of
those communications would be determined separately, by
evaluating the general accessibility of the technology required to
capture each stream.133 The technology required to intercept a
public phone call, the human ear, is generally accessible to the
public. The technology required to intercept an e-mail from a data
stream is not. While it may be reasonable that another person
within earshot could overhear a conversation taking place, that
does not affect an individual‘s expectation of privacy regarding the
e-mail communication his phone is simultaneously receiving.134
The three titles of ECPA separate communications not just by
the level of privacy an individual can reasonably expect but also by
the characteristics of the communication itself.135 In determining
the nature of a given communication there are three remaining

130

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2 (―The police might, for example, learn how many people
are in a particular house by setting up year-round surveillance; but that does not make
breaking and entering to find out the same information lawful.‖).
131
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (―Although petitioner‘s conduct
may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct
was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he
dialed.‖).
132
See Jenna Worthham, Cell Phones Now Used More for Data Than for Calls, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/
technology/personaltech/14talk.html.
133
See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 3773994, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 8,
2010).
134
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (―But what he sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do
so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.‖).
135
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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questions a court must ask: (1) was the communication considered
―stored‖ or ―in transmission‖ when it was intercepted?; (2) does
the communication contain ―content‖ or ―non-content‖
information; and (3) is there an exception provided for by the
statute?
1. Is it Stored or in Transmission?
The ECPA treats stored electronic communications differently
than communications that are in transmission. The statutory
language is clear: Title I of the ECPA covers only the interception
of electronic communications136 while Title II deals only with
stored communications.137 Yet despite this clarity courts are still
divided on how this language should apply.
Many courts find that Title I and Title II of the ECPA are
mutually exclusive.138 These courts focus on the distinction
between ―interception‖ and ―access,‖ and find that it is impossible
for an electronic communication to violate both provisions.139 The
rationale is that the ECPA defines the two states of an electronic
communication separately, and because the word ―transfer‖ only
describes the transmission and not the ―electronic storage,‖ the two
titles are discrete.140 A communication therefore must fit into one
of the two categories; there is no middle ground.
136

See id.
See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006) (applying to whoever ―obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage‖).
138
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 890 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1058–59 (9th Cir. 1998)); In re Double Click Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d
817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2000); State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services,
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
139
See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–79.
140
Id. at 877 (―Congress‘ use of the word ‗transfer‘ in the definition of ‗electronic
communication,‘ and its omission in that definition of the phrase ‗any electronic storage
of such communication‘ . . . reflects that Congress did not intend for ‗intercept‘ to apply
to ‗electronic communications‘ when those communications are in ‗electronic storage‘‖
(internal citations omitted)); Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997)
(―[B]y including the electronic storage of wire communications within the definition of
such communications but declining to do the same for electronic communications—
Congress sufficiently evinced its intent to make acquisitions of electronic
137
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Similarly, these courts also apply a narrow definition of
―interception‖141 and find that the Federal Wiretap Act covers only
electronic communications that are acquired contemporaneously
with their transmission.142 Once an electronic communication
passes into storage, even temporarily, it switches over to Title II.
Because a stored communication can no longer be ―intercepted‖ it
is governed by the requirements of the SCA.
At least one court, the Seventh Circuit, has rejected this
interpretation of the statute.143 In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz,
the Seventh Circuit examined the relationship between the Wiretap
Act and SCA as they apply to the interception of e-mails.144 The
case arose from a situation in which office politics had gone too
far. Mr. Szymuszkiewicz feared that he was going to lose his
job.145 To obtain more information, he sneaked on to his boss‘s
computer and configured Microsoft Outlook to forward him copies
of all the messages his boss received.146
Szymuszkiewicz was charged under the Wiretap Act for
illegally intercepting his boss‘s e-mails.147 Szymuszkiewicz
contested the charge as a matter of timing, arguing that

communications unlawful under [the Wiretap Act] only if they occur contemporaneously
with their transmissions.‖); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (―[I]ntercepting an electronic communication . . . means acquiring the transfer of
data. . . . [T]he definitions thus imply . . . that the acquisition of the data be simultaneous
with the original transmission of the data.‖). See also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a narrow definition of intercept is appropriate in
the context of electronic communications).
141
See Steve Jackson Games Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir.
1994) (defining the term ―intercept‖ to mean an acquisition contemporaneous with
transmission).
142
See Konop, 302 F.3d at 878 (―In cases concerning ‗electronic communications‘—the
definition of which specifically includes ‗transfers‘ and specifically excludes ‗storage‘—
the ‗narrow‘ definition of ‗intercept‘ fits like a glove; it is natural to except noncontemporaneous retrievals from the scope of the Wiretap Act.‖ (quoting United States v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998))).
143
See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010).
144
Id. at 703.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *1
(E.D. Wis. June 30, 2009) (Szymuszkiewicz was charged with three counts of
intercepting an electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)).

LEVIS (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/12/2011 2:00 PM

MIXED SIGNALS IN MOBILE PRIVACY

213

interception must be defined narrowly to mean ―contemporaneous
with transmission.‖148 According to Szymuszkiewicz, alleging a
violation of the Wiretap Act was inappropriate because his boss‘s
computer did not forward the e-mails until after they were
received.149 Under this narrow reading of the statute, his e-mail
surveillance efforts did not violate the SCA because, as he argued,
if the e-mail was forwarded after it was stored on the host
computer then it could not be intercepted.150
The court rejected this interpretation for two reasons. First, the
plain language of the statute provides no timing requirement for
interception.151 This argument is similar to the one advanced in
Judge Reinhardt‘s opinion in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,152 a
case that also interprets Internet privacy. Judge Reinhardt,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, pointed out that the
ECPA defines ―intercept‖ as the ―aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through
the use of any electronic . . . device.‖153 Courts that apply a narrow
definition of ―intercept‖ appear to ignore this language and define
interception differently.154
148

Id. at *7.
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 703.
150
The idea that interception must be contemporaneous with transmission is derived
from an earlier case, United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976). See Konop
v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Turk interpreted an earlier version of the Wiretap Act, before the
amendments made by ECPA included electronic communications. Id. Because the
statute has since been revised, the language the Turk court relied on no longer exists thus
overruling the requirement that interception be contemporaneous with transmission. Id.
151
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (―There is no timing requirement in the Wiretap
Act, and judges ought not add to statutory definitions.‖ (citing Lockhart v. United States,
546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005))).
152
Konop, 302 F.3d at 887 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153
Id. at 876 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.
1994).
Prior to the 1986 amendment by the ECPA, the Wiretap Act defined
‗intercept‘ as the ‗aural acquisition‘ of the contents of wire or oral
communications through the use of a device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)
(1968). The ECPA amended this definition to include the ‗aural or
other acquisition of the contents of . . . wire, electronic, or oral
communications. . . .‘ 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986) (emphasis added
for new terms). The significance of the addition of the words ‗or
149
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The court‘s second reason for rejecting Szymuszkiewicz‘s
argument focused on the differences between the transmission of
electronic and wire communications. Wire communications, like
telephones, use circuit switching technology.155 Circuit switching
creates a single electronic pathway or circuit between the devices
involved in a call.156 Alternatively, electronic communications use
―packet switching‖ to send data.157 ―Packet switching‖ breaks a
message down into small packets of data.158 These packets contain
not only information about the content of the message, but also
routing information, like an address, that tells the packet where it
has to go.159 Each packet travels independently.160 The network
then arranges and resends the packets as necessary so that at least
one copy of each packet (there may be many) reaches its final
destination.161 Once all of the packets for a given message are
received, a computer then uses a specific protocol162 to reassemble
the packets and create the entire message.163
The Szymuszkiewicz court reasoned that because of these
technological differences, it would be impossible to apply a timing
other‘ in the 1986 amendment to the definition of ‗intercept‘ becomes
clear when the definitions of ‗aural‘ and ‗electronic communication‘
are examined; electronic communications (which include the nonvoice portions of wire communications), as defined by the Act,
cannot be acquired aurally.
Id.
155

See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 704.
See id.
157
See id.
158
See Lee Copeland, Quick Study: Packet-Switched vs. Circuit Switched Networks,
COMPUTERWORLD
(Mar.
20,
2000),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/41904/Packet_Switched_vs._Circuit_Switched_Networks; see also Paul Baran
and the Origins of the Internet, RAND CORPORATION, http://www.rand.org/about/history/
baran.list.html (last modified Mar. 28, 2011).
159
See Copeland, supra note 158.
160
See id.
161
See id.
162
A ―protocol‖ is a standard language by which computers communicate with one
another. For instance, there are three e-mail protocols that govern how an e-mail
message can be transmitted and received—POP, IMAP, and SMTP. See Vic Laurie,
Computer Protocols: TCP, IP, UDP, POP, SMTP, HTTP, FTP and More, COMPUTER
EDUC., http://vlaurie.com/computers2/Articles/protocol.htm (last updated July 13, 2011,
5:17 PM).
163
See Copeland, supra note 158.
156
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requirement to information sent over a packet switched network.164
Interception could never take place contemporaneously with
transmission because there is no continuous connection between
the two ends of an electronic communication.165 Following a
narrow definition of ―interception‖ in the context of electronic
communications therefore would produce conflicting and
inconsistent results.166
To further highlight this argument, the court focused on Voice
Over Internet Protocol (―VoIP‖) services that allow users to make
telephone calls over the Internet.167 These services deliver phone
calls through packet switched networks rather than the traditional
circuit switched telephone lines.168 A reading of the Wiretap Act
that protects against interception only if it is contemporaneous with
transmission ignores VoIP phone calls and criminalizes only those
made through traditional circuit switching channels.169 Given that
the Wiretap Act protects the content of a phone call,170 this surely
would be an unintended result. If the statute protects the content of
a phone call, then when that call was intercepted should be
irrelevant.171
164

See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (2010).
Id. at 705 (―Szymuszkiewicz‘s understanding of ‗interception‘ as ‗catching a thing
in flight‘ is sensible enough for football, but for email there is no single ‗thing‘ that flies
straight from sender to recipient. When sender and recipient are connected by a single
circuit, and the spy puts a ‗tap‘ in between, the football analogy makes some sense . . .
For e-mail, however, there are no dedicated circuits. There are only packets, segments of
a message that take different routes at different times.‖).
166
Id. at 705 (―The difference between circuit-switch and packet-switch transmission
methods thus is irrelevant under § 2510.‖ (citing 18 U.S.C. §2510(4) which defines
―interception‖ as ―aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic . . . device.‖ (emphasis added))).
167
See id. at 706.
168
See generally In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4869 (2004) (reviewing
Internet telephony in comparison to traditional landline technology).
169
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.
170
See id. at 706; see also Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980);
Ali v. Douglas Cable Communc‘n, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996); United States. v.
Borch, 695 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
171
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.
Many phone calls today are made by digitizing speech and
transferring the result by packet switching. Transmission by packet
switching allows for multiple simultaneous messages over a single
circuit and so is cheaper than circuit switching. The adoption of
165
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The court extended its reasoning to the e-mail transmissions.172
If the Wiretap Act would prevent someone from intercepting a call
made using VoIP, then it should also prevent someone from
intercepting an e-mail. Since both use the same protocol to
transmit information, any requirement that e-mails be intercepted
as they were being sent would be equally inappropriate.173 A
different interpretation of the statute would create a conflict and
allow e-mails to be read in some situations but not in others.
Addressing Szymuszkiewicz‘s argument that he had been
charged under the wrong statute, the court also held that both the
Wiretap Act and the SCA could apply to a single communication
and that nothing prohibits both sections from applying at the same
time.174 ―Overlapping criminal statutes are nothing new,‖ and the
court held that it is appropriate to allow overlapping set of statutes
in a civil context as well.175
The SCA does not explicitly repeal any part of the Wiretap
Act, and the court held that each statute is therefore ―fully
enforceable according to its own terms.‖176 This reasoning
recognizes and accounts for the differences between electronic and

packet switching is not limited to ‗voice over IP‘ services such as
Vonage or Skype. The fourth-generation protocol for mobile phones,
being introduced this year in the United States, is one part of an effort
to transmit all voice communications by IP (‗Internet Protocol‘, a
packet-switched method) before many more years have passed. See
3rd Generation Partnership Project, All–IP Network (AIPN)
Feasibility Study, Technical Report no. 22.978 rel. 8 (Dec. 2008).
The ‗interception‘ of a communication sent in packets must be done
by programming a computer to copy the contents it sends along (and
reassemble them later), which was exactly what Szymuszkiewicz told
Infusino‘s computer to do with her incoming emails. In saying that
the Wiretap Act‘s definitions treat the acquisition of emails as an
interception, we ensure that the Act applies to packet-switched phone
calls too.
Id.
172

Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
174
Id. at 705 (―We agree with Councilman‟s conclusion on that subject (as well as its
conclusion that the Stored Communications Act does not repeal any part of the Wiretap
Act by implication; each statute is fully enforceable according to its own terms).‖).
175
Id. at 706.
176
Id. at 705.
173
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traditional communications, and in so doing removes the conflict
that arises when a narrow definition of interception is used. Under
the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning, both parts of the ECPA may apply
to electronic communications while communications that employ
traditional circuit switching technology need not look further than
the Wiretap Act.
2. Is it Content or Not?
Whether a communication contains content information plays a
dual role in an ECPA analysis. On one hand, classifying
something as non-content data can result in bypassing all privacy
protections.177 On the other hand, classifying something as noncontent data can simply move the information to falling under Title
III of the ECPA.178 While the standard is a low one under Title III,
requiring only ―certification‖ that the information sought is part of
an ongoing investigation, those seeking to access information
under this title must still obtain a court order.179 Non-content
information may be outside the realm of reasonable expectations of
privacy as defined by Katz, but it still falls within the protective
language of the ECPA.

177

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (holding that when revealing his affairs to another, the depositor
assumes the risk that business records kept by a bank will be turned over to the
government); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973) (holding that no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed in records that were turned over to an
accountant for tax preparation). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)
(holding that the content of a conversation between petitioner and a government
informant was not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
178
See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006) (―the term ‗pen register‘ means a device or process
which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of
any communication‖); Id. § 3127(4) (―the term ‗trap and trace device‘ means a device or
process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication‖).
179
See id. § 3122(b)(2) (―a certification by the applicant that the information likely to
be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that
agency.‖).
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Courts have only recently applied Title III to location-based
information. In the past, the Pen Register Statute only controlled
access to phone numbers.180 However, in 2001, the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT
Act)181 expanded the statutory definition of a pen register
device.182 This new definition made it possible to record noncontent information sent as part of an electronic or wire
communication.183 Law enforcement took advantage of this
change and, following the PATRIOT Act‘s amendment of ECPA,
began trying to obtain location-based information via pen register
devices.184 By classifying location-based information as falling
under Title III, law enforcement is able to avoid the higher
standards imposed by both Title I and Title II.
There was, however, one significant roadblock to this analysis.
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(―CALEA‖) expressly limited law enforcement access to locationbased information.185 The statute was designed to ensure that as
telecommunications networks evolved, law enforcement would
continue to have access to the information necessary to do its
job.186 Telecommunications companies needed to maintain their
networks in such a way that it was possible to access ―callidentifying information,‖ along with ―electronic messaging‖ and
―information services‖ used for sharing among computer
devices.187 This requirement that information systems remain
accessible to law enforcement is balanced by the limitations placed
180
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (―A pen register is a mechanical device that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the
dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed.‖ (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977))).
181
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3121).
182
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
183
See id. § 3127.
184
See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
185
See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
186
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489.
187
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02 (2006).
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on the scope of law enforcement access. Recognizing that
location-based information is more sensitive than the phone
numbers an individual dials, the statute dictates that ―information
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap
and trace devices . . . shall not include any information that may
disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the
extent that location may be determined from the telephone
number).‖188
Several courts have interpreted the phrase ―solely pursuant‖ to
mean that the Pen Register Statute may be combined with some
additional statutory authority to allow recording beyond what is
explicitly listed in the statute.189 Courts often rely on the SCA for
this additional authority.190 Though it was intended to apply only
to stored communications, the SCA authorizes the government to
require a provider of electronic communications to disclose ―a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such service.‖191 This language is very similar to that
used by the Supreme Court in addressing non-content information
in other customer/subscriber situations.192 Just like bank records or
telephone numbers are non-content subscriber information, cell-

188

47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info.,
497 F. Supp. 2d. 301, 308 (D.P.R. 2007) (―[N]o such unclarity exists on the face of the
statute. In particular, I do not see how the phrase ‗solely pursuant‘ in Section 1002(a)(2)
can be read so as not to convey the meaning that the Pen Register Statute may be used in
combination with some other authority for the purpose the government seeks.‖); see also
In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452, nn.11–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (listing all of
the cases that have decided for and against this hybrid use of the statute).
190
See In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
191
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006).
192
The language of this section of the statute very closely mirrors the exception for
―business records‖ of other non-content information cases. See United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (―On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not
respondent‘s ‗private papers.‘ . . . [R]espondent can assert neither ownership nor
possession. Instead, these are the business records of the banks.‖).
189
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site information may be considered a ―record or other information‖
with regard to the use of a cell phone.193
Users automatically disclose their location to the cell phone
company every time they turn on their phones.194 Once a phone
connects to a tower the cell phone company knows that user‘s
location.195 If cell phone companies store this information as
traditional phone companies keep records of the phone numbers
dialed, then a list of that user‘s locations falls within the overlap
between the two statutes. However, the situation changes when
dealing with prospective, i.e. real-time, location-based data that is
not yet recorded.
Courts that are in favor of treating cell-site information as
―stored‖ data follow the narrow reading of interception that was
rejected by the Szymuszkiewicz court.196 These courts treat realtime location-based information as stored data because this
information is received by the cell phone service provider and
recorded on its system momentarily before it is forwarded to law
enforcement officials.197 As the SCA applies to communications
in temporary storage, location-based information falls within its
reach.198
Courts in opposition to this reading point to several
weaknesses. In analyzing the SCA, these courts argue that nothing
in the statute contemplates ongoing surveillance in real-time, but
rather that the SCA seeks only to control the circumstance under
which the government can compel the disclosure of existing
communications.199 Unlike the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register

193

See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-897 (NGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93494, at *18–19
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
194
See supra Part I.A.
195
See supra Part I.B.
196
See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2010).
197
See In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
198
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2006) (defining electronic storage as ―any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof‖).
199
See In re Application of the U.S. for Orders Authorizing the Installation & Use of
Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel. No. [Sealed] & [Sealed], 416 F.
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Statute which are expressly designed to allow real-time
surveillance, the SCA contains no limitation on the amount of time
that law enforcement, pursuant to a court order, can maintain its
investigation.200
Perhaps the SCA‘s minimal procedural
safeguards reveal Congress‘ intent. If the purpose of the SCA is to
allow for real-time surveillance, as permitted under the Wiretap
Act and Pen Register Statute, Congress could have included some
restriction on duration as it did in the other two sections.
While both sides present good arguments, it is currently
unclear where location-based information stands within the Title
III framework. This is further complicated by the observation that
if the SCA is applicable to location-based information and is
sufficient to fill the gap in the Pen Register Statute then it is
unclear why location-based information is not governed by the
SCA‘s higher standards of access.
3. Is it an Exception to the ECPA?
Even if a piece of information falls perfectly within the reach
of one of the three titles, it may not be protected because it is
excepted from the ECPA entirely. There are a handful of
exceptions to the statute, available to private parties and the
government, that allow for the disclosure of intercepted
information.201
Some of these exceptions are granted to allow for the day-today operation of the telecommunication industry. 202 Keeping in
mind that individuals can reasonably expect the content of a phone
Supp. 2d 390, 395 n.7 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. For an Order (1)
Authorizing The Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); In re Application For Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device With Cell Site Location
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
200
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
201
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii).
202
For example, the protections of the ECPA do not apply to the activity of any officer,
employee, or agent of a wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are
used in transmitting these communications, from intercepting or disclosing information
―in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service.‖ Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
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call to remain private, instances still exist in which the telephone
service provider may need to listen in on a user‘s conversation.
For example, a communications service provider may need to
perform maintenance or quality control assessments that require
listening in on a certain line. Accordingly, the ECPA contains an
exception for service provider activity that aims to balance the
interest of both the wire communication provider and the paying
customer.203 However this is only a limited exception for service
providers, and its aim is to maintain individual privacy in
situations not related to the necessary maintenance and upkeep of
the communication system.204 This exception protects phone
companies that provide a valuable service from lawsuits related to
activity necessary to carry on everyday operations, but allows users
to continue making phone calls confident that there is not some
idle operator listening in on the line.
Other exceptions are also necessary to protect public
information.
For example, the ECPA removes from the
protections of the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the Pen Register
Statute any electronic communications that are ―readily accessible‖
to the general public.205 This dovetails with the rationale of Katz
and the disclosure cases.206 Once a communication is made public,
an individual has no expectation that this communication will
remain private.207 The ECPA recognizes this change in privacy
and removes public information from the scope of its protection.208
The most important exception to the ECPA, at least for the
purposes of this Note, allows for the disclosure of a

203
204
205
206
207

See id. § 2511(2)(a).
See id.
Id. § 2511(2)(g).
See supra Part II.
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.

Id.
208

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g).
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communication if one party has consented to it.209 Mirroring the
language used in the disclosure cases,210 the ECPA removes from
the scope of its protection information for which: (1) the observer
was a ―party‖ to the communication;211 and (2) one of the parties
has given consent to its interception.212 This also mirrors the Katz
analysis in that information disclosed to another party is subject to
a lower expectation of privacy given that if a person consents to
the interception, whether by inviting a friend over,213 filling out a
form,214 or consciously providing information in some other way,
he cannot then turn around and revoke that disclosure.215
The methods of sharing that the exception contemplated,
however, are rather traditional.
Technology has recently
complicated the possible ways that users may voluntarily share
their current locations. In applying the existing framework to
location-based mobile services, sharing one‘s information through
an app could likely be considered a form of consent. But unlike
disclosing a secret to a friend or filling out a survey, in a digital

209

Id. § 2511(2)(d).
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03
(1966) (holding that the giving of consent to an informant‘s presence is valid because the
misplaced confidence that one will not reveal wrongdoing does not create a legitimate
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
211
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.
Id.
212
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006) (―subsection (a) of this section does not
apply with respect to conduct authorized . . . (2) by a user of that [wire or electronic
communication] service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user‖)
(emphasis added).
213
See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
214
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
215
The situation where one enters personal information on a website and clicks submit
is less troublesome in this regard. See id. at 502 n.8.
210
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world it is not always obvious what the user is consenting to and
perhaps more importantly, where that consent begins and ends.
Data collection on the Internet and on a mobile phone may
occur without a user ever knowing it.216 Many websites for
example use a small file called a cookie217 to collect information
about those who visit their site.218 In theory cookies can be
helpful.
A cookie can ―store useful information such as
usernames, passwords, and preferences, making it easier for users
to access Web pages in an efficient manner.‖219 They can also be
harmful, when for example they are used to store and report
information from a user‘s browsing history to a third party.220 In
this and similar situations, a user may believe that the information
stored is private.221
Complicating the consent analysis is the possibility that in a
digital context the user may not know the third party receiving his
information exists. This is common in situations that involve
mobile and web-based advertising. Usually there are at least three
parties to such an information transfer: the user, the website, and
an unaffiliated advertising network.222 The website and the ad
network likely have an agreement that allows the ad network to
access information about the website‘s users. The ad network
places a cookie on a user‘s computer when he visits a customer‘s
website. The cookie collects the user‘s information which is then
funneled off to the ad network. In exchange for access to this
information, the ad network supplies the website with advertising
that is targeted to its users based on the information it collects from
the cookies. Because a user is not a party to this agreement, the ad
216

See generally Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect
User Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703983704576277101723453610.html.
217
Cookies are text files that a website sends to a user‘s computer that allow the
website to track his movements. See Adam L. Penenberg, Why Web Surfers Love To Hate
Cookies, SLATE MAG. (Nov. 7, 2005, 4:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2129656/.
218
See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03.
219
Id.
220
See id.
221
The class of users that initiated the suit in DoubleClick alleged that the cookies were
reporting names, email addresses, home and business addresses, phone numbers, searches
performed, and websites visited. See id. at 503.
222
See generally id. This analysis is modeled on the facts of the DoubleClick case.
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network is effectively collecting data using a cookie that the
website, and not the web user, gave it permission to install.
Under the ECPA it is not clear if authorization is required from
the actual end user;223 the agreement between the website and the
ad network may be sufficient for purposes of the exception. In
light of the Katz privacy test, the ad network‘s actions are justified
by the rationale of the disclosure cases. Once a user discloses
information to a third party, his reasonable expectation of privacy
decreases.224 If the user consented to the website‘s collection of
his information, which arguably he did by visiting the site, 225 then
the website can authorize the third party ad network to step in.
This disclosure-based rational is mirrored by the ECPA.
Under the SCA, because the information collected was intended
for the visited website, that website may then authorize whoever it
wants to access the data.226 Similarly because the website was a
―party‖ to the original communication, it is free to intercept data
under the Wiretap Act as well.227 If the website is authorized to
intercept the data, arguably it should be allowed to pass that
information on to another party.228
223

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006).
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.
Id.
224
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
225
See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (―By the
very act of sending a communication over the Internet, the party expressly consents to the
recording of the message.‖).
226
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006).
227
See id. § 2511(2)(d).
228
In reaching its conclusion, the court seems to ignore where the ad network appears
in the transmission. In order to supply content, the ad network must step in at some point
between the user requesting the web address and the loading of the page. The ad network
therefore likely gets some information about the user from the cookie before the site
actually loads. If this is the case, the information was not transferred from the website to
the ad network but instead directly from the user‘s computer. See In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (―DoubleClick acts as an
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While this exception seems broad, it is not absolute. The
Wiretap Act provides a fallback provision that will invalidate the
consent and therefore the exception if the information is
intercepted ―for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
act.‖229 However, this is a very difficult standard to meet. The
web user must show intent and demonstrate that the desire to
commit a tortious act was the primary motivation or at least a
determinative factor in the ad network‘s actions.230 It is not
enough to simply prove that the defendant committed a tort or
crime—in this case a privacy violation.231 Instead, to obtain relief,
a user must prove that the ad network collected his data because it
wanted to commit a bad act. Thus, even if the user can prove that
he was harmed by the collection of data,232 that alone is not
sufficient for relief under the ECPA.
III. CONFLICTING RESULTS
The ECPA attempts to base the protection it provides on the
relative levels of privacy individuals expect for their
information.233 This approach of varied treatment in many ways
codifies the Katz view of privacy.234 However, it should not be the
sole foundation for defining mobile privacy.
Mobile communications are fundamentally different from the
traditional communications Katz addressed, both in how they are
used and transmitted. In mobile communications oftentimes users
are not telling a secret to a friend or filling out a survey—the kind
of disclosure Katz envisioned—but instead are sending a rich data
stream from their mobile device with several different types of
information; location-based information is just one category.

intermediary between host Web sites and Web sites seeking to place banner
advertisements.‖).
229
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
230
See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514–15 (quoting United States v.
Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
231
See id. at 516.
232
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2006)
(examining the harm that electronic surveillance creates).
233
See supra Part II.
234
See id.
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Rather than address these communications separately, the ECPA
treats all digital information sent from a user‘s mobile device the
same.235 To enable the Katz rationale to fit, the ECPA: (1)
incorrectly categorizes information as stored or in transmission; (2)
incorrectly assumes that location is non-content information; and
(3) misapplies the consent exceptions within a mobile context.
A. The ECPA Incorrectly Defines “Stored Communication”
One of the major difficulties courts face when applying the
ECPA is distinguishing communications that are stored from those
that are in transmission.236 The statute appears to draw the
distinction based on when and where a communication is
intercepted.237
However, actually applying this ―stored/in
transmission‖ distinction correctly to digital information proves to
be almost impossible.
The stored/in transmission line does not accurately reflect how
electronic communications are transmitted.238
Electronic
239
communications have a dual nature.
The packets that carry the
communication are stored pieces of data. Yet those packets are
also in transmission as they are sent to their final location.240 The
ECPA ignores the fact that electronic communications are really
the product of stored bits of information being transferred and then
very quickly reassembled to create the final product. Packetswitching is fundamentally different than an analog
communication involving live audio like a telephone conversation.
In a live conversation the audio is not automatically stored. The
information transmitted will be lost (except for in the listeners‘
memories) unless someone uses a recording device. Electronic
communications, like emails, must always be converted into
packets before they are sent to their final destination, and therefore
must always be stored as data before they are transmitted. Thus
one who intercepts an electronic communication would be
235
236
237
238
239
240

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See id.
See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2010).
See id.
See id.
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intercepting stored information even though he was doing so while
it was in transmission.
Because electronic communications involve the transmission of
stored information, maintaining the stored/in transmission
distinction frustrates the purpose of the ECPA. The Wiretap Act
was originally designed to prevent the negative consequences of
real-time surveillance.241 Focusing solely on the status of a
communication at the transmission stage ignores the potential harm
created by the interception of that message. The Szymuszkiewicz
court identified this conflict by examining how its decision would
impact the classification of VoIP services.242 VoIP is a new
technology that provides an ―old‖ technology function—phone
calls. Listening in on phone calls is precisely the kind of harm the
Wiretap Act was designed to prevent. If the Wiretap Act only
applied in situations where interception was contemporaneous with
transmission, a phone call made using VoIP technology would not
be protected.243 Instead, it would be governed by the rules of the
SCA and subject to a much lower standard for access along with an
unlimited time frame of observation.244
The method of transmitting a call, or any other electronic
communication, should not affect the level of privacy protection it
receives.
Maintaining the stored/in transmission distinction
ignores
the
functional
similarities
between
different
communications that may logically justify equal protection. For
example, VoIP is the functional equivalent of a phone call.245
There is no dispute that the content of a phone call is protected.246
It should not be that an individual loses that protection simply by
placing a call from something other than a landline. Regardless of
241

Solove, supra note 232, at 492–93.
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.
243
See supra Part II. It may be possible to argue otherwise if the person using a VoIP
service called someone with a traditional landline telephone and that call was tapped
from the wire connection and not the VoIP end of the call. However, this argument is
precisely the point this note stands against.
244
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
245
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (―Transmission by packet switching allows for
multiple simultaneous messages over a single circuit and so is cheaper than circuit
switching.‖).
246
See supra Part II.
242
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how the conversation is transmitted, by copper wire or by packets
of information, the resulting service is the same. Because a phone
call on either system provides the same service for the user, society
would reasonably expect that the privacy afforded to each system
be the same. As a result, the harm to society of eavesdropping in
either case is also the same. These functional similarities and not
the method of transmission should be used to determine the
appropriate level of protection.
The stored/in transmission distinction is particularly important
to the regulation of location-based mobile services because of the
way courts have incorporated location-based data into the Pen
Register Statute. This determination is very similar to the VoIP
analogy mentioned above. Because location-based data is stored
momentarily during the transmission process, it is subject to the
lesser protections offered by the SCA.247 This, read together with
the Pen Register Statute, subjects a user‘s current location,
possibly the most sensitive piece of information, to the lowest level
of privacy protection.248
Just like the VoIP example, for location-based data it should
not matter whether there is momentary storage. The focus should
instead be on the harm created by the real-time surveillance of a
user‘s location. Arguably, this approach is already built into the
ECPA, and both the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register Statute
impose time limits and other conditions on situations that involve
real-time surveillance.249 Since the method of transmission, and
thus how that data may be intercepted, does not affect or alter the
potential societal harm, the technical method of transmission
should not affect the amount of protection a communication
receives.

247

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
249
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006) (―No order entered under this section may authorize or
approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event
longer than thirty days.‖); Id. § 3123(c)(1) (―An order issued under this section shall
authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period
not to exceed sixty days.‖). The SCA does not contemplate real time data and therefore
does not impose a time limit on government access.
248
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B. The Pen Register Statute Incorrectly Assumes Location is NonContent Information
While the language of the Pen Register Statute may allow for a
hybrid reading in combination with the SCA, that interpretation
should not be applied to location-based information.
The
classification of location-based information as non-content data
does not accurately reflect the public‘s use of that information.
The Pen Register Statute, which traditionally governed access to
phone numbers,250 imposes a very low hurdle to access only
because the information it was meant to protect is non-content
data251 that was necessarily disclosed to a third party. 252 Locationbased user data meets neither of these criteria.
The way the general public currently uses location-based data
supports the argument that such data is content. Users who permit
location-based services to share their location with others can
choose when they will allow that information to be shared. There
is no default public setting for one‘s location, as there is with a
phone number or mailing address in a public directory.253 Except
pursuant to a court order, any sharing of information is at the
user‘s discretion. It appears, therefore, that users value locationbased information more than they do other public information.
Users share such information only at the times and places that they
choose to. And furthermore, when the disclosure of a user‘s
location is linked to a social network or media outlet, the sharing
of that information creates content for other users.

250

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (―A government agency authorized to install and use a pen
register or trap and trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic
or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information utilized in
the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic communications so as not to include
the contents of any wire or electronic communications.‖) (emphasis added).
252
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
253
See In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos.
(SEALED) and (sealed) and the Prod. of Real Time Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599
(D. Md. 2005) (―As the phone changes location, it automatically switches to the cell site
that provides the best reception,‖ and therefore there is no default location).
251
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This release of data has a minimum value simply because it is
restricted. As far back as 2001, courts recognized a value in this
user information.254 The following explosion of a data-based web
economy took this proposition even farther. Not only does data
have value for the companies that collect it, but users have also
recognized that they control an asset that can be used as currency
for exchange.255 Mobile check-in based applications illustrate this
fundamental change in how data is used. Data has in some cases
become a form of currency.256 Users that check-in to places are
often given rewards for their information. These rewards range
from digital goods, like badges,257 to coupons,258 to physical
products like a scoop of gelato.259 The fact that retailers and
businesses are willing to exchange physical goods for information
suggests that there is real value in this information. This value sets
it apart from something like a phone number or address, which in
many cases, is freely accessible to anyone with a phone book; no
one pays you for information in the phone book.
Applying the Katz test in light of how users treat their locationbased information supports moving this class of data outside of the
Pen Register Statute. Users possess a subjective expectation of
privacy in their location. A user‘s location is private by default,
and it remains so until it is shared. This is in complete contrast to a
phone number, which users should understand is public by
254
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(―DoubleClick creates value for its customers in large part by building detailed profiles of
Internet users and using them to target clients‘ advertisements.‖).
255
See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
256
See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03 (―When users visit any of these
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites, a ‗cookie‘ is placed on their hard drives.‖).
257
See What is Foursquare?, FOURSQAURE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited
Sept. 13, 2011) (―By ‗checking in‘ via a smartphone app or SMS, users share their
location with friends while collecting points and virtual badges.‖). For a list of badges,
see The Full List of Foursquare Badges, 4SQUAREBADGES.COM, http://www.
4squarebadges.com/foursquare-badge-list/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
258
See Jon Fougner, Introducing Deals, FACEBOOK (Jan. 31, 2011, 9:58 AM),
http://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=446183422130.
259
This is just one example of a Foursquare promotion. This one was instituted by
Whole Foods and it gave away a physical product. See, e.g., Nick Saint, Whole Foods
Pushing Its Foursquare Promotion Hard, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:26 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/wholefoods-is-pushing-its-foursquare-promotion-hard2010-8.
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default.260 This fundamental difference affects the way in which
users value these different types of information. Users recognize
that private information, which definitionally is more difficult to
obtain, may be assigned a higher value than public information that
is available to everyone. That there is a market for location-based
information is proof of this value and further demonstrates the fact
that users believe that their information is private until they choose
to share it. Furthermore, this expectation of privacy is one that
society would likely recognize as reasonable. In this instance,
smartphone users benefit from the Kyllo standard.261 Locationbased information, unless it is shared, is something that cannot be
observed without special technology.262 Because this technology
is not generally available to the public, society would recognize an
individual‘s expectation of privacy in his location as reasonable, at
least until it is publicly disclosed.
C. The Consent Exceptions to the ECPA Are Too Broad
Data collectors can always acquire consent to collect user
information. Within the Katz framework, once a user shares his
location with a third party or consents to its capture, he loses any
expectation of privacy he previously had.263 Users that choose to
share their location with others recognize, or should recognize, that
this is the case.264 The Internet, however, has changed the way
data is transmitted between parties. The current concerns
regarding consent are not about how information is being used.
Instead, the concerns involve the transfer of information to a third
260
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (finding that telephone subscribers
cannot ―harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret‖).
261
See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
262
See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (―There are two distinct technological approaches for fixing the location of a
cell phone: handset-based (GPS) and network-based (cell site).‖).
263
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (―What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.‖ (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927))).
264
For websites like Foursquare that publicly stream check-ins down their homepage,
this assertion is more obvious than it is for closed networks like Facebook in which
information may be disclosed to only a limited number of individuals. However the
effect on privacy is the same.
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party, one to whom the user never provided direct consent and the
existence of whom the user may not even be aware.
DoubleClick265 illustrates the potential problems of transferring
consent in this situation. In its decision, the court analyzed the use
of cookies, in online advertising. It held that for DoubleClick, an
online advertising network, to collect information from a user it
needed only to obtain permission from the website that user
accessed, and not from the user himself.266 The court‘s reasoning
was similar to that in the disclosure cases.267 The court reasoned
that the information the user disclosed to the website was
analogous to information one discloses to another person during a
conversation. Just as the other party to the conversation would be
free to tell his friends about anything that was said, a website
should be free to disclose any information it receives from a user‘s
visit.268 Because anything a user knowingly discloses to the
public, or in this case a website, is no longer subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no reason that the
website should be prevented from disclosing that information.
However, this is an imperfect analogy. Users never utilized
DoubleClick‘s services voluntarily.
Instead, DoubleClick
collected user data as it was transmitted to the website.
DoubleClick sat between the user and the website as a silent
middle man. Users who visited the websites associated with
DoubleClick did not know that their information was being
collected by anyone other than the site they were visiting. They
had never actively granted consent to DoubleClick‘s collecting
their data.
This factual difference was insignificant to the DoubleClick
court.269 The court reasoned that because the user had granted
permission to the website to collect its information, that website
was then free to transfer whatever it collected to a third party. The
court explained that if the information being supplied to the
website could be freely transferred once the website possessed it,
265
266
267
268
269

In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 510.
See id. at 510–11.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 514.
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then the website should be allowed to skip a step and authorize
DoubleClick to intercept the transfer and collect the data necessary
to supply advertisements.270 Functionally the end result is the
same—DoubleClick gets the user data it needs—but the legal
implications are very different.
The court‘s approval of the DoubleClick model substantially
alters how consent functions on the Internet. Traditionally, under
the Fourth Amendment, only information that a user knowingly
discloses to the public is no longer subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. After DoubleClick, a knowing exchange of
information is no longer necessary; the intended recipient of a
user‘s data can grant consent to others to collect that information.
This nuance restricts a user‘s ability to choose the websites with
which he wishes to share information.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Courts that are forced to interpret the ECPA are left with a
difficult task. They must balance individual privacy with the
freedom to use emerging technologies. Fortunately, this conflict
can be resolved. Correcting each of the flaws enumerated above
will provide substantial progress by creating an ECPA that more
accurately reflects the modern use of technology. Some of these
solutions are already being implemented. H.R. 5777271 for
instance shows that Congress is starting to recognize the problems
that currently surround data collection. However, there is more
that can and should be done.
A. Redefine Stored Communication
Congress should modify the ECPA to eliminate the distinction
between communications that are stored or in transmission when

270

Id.
See Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice
Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act, H.R. 5777, 111th
Cong. (2010). In July 2010, Representative Bobby L. Rush (D. Ill.) introduced
legislation ―[t]o foster transparency about the commercial use of personal information,
provide consumers with meaningful choice about the collection, use, and disclosure of
such information, and for other purposes.‖ Id.
271
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they are intercepted. Not only is the distinction illogical but it is
also unnecessary. As it is now drafted, the plain language of the
statute supports the Szymuszkiewicz court‘s reading of mutual
inclusion.272 The term ―intercept‖ is defined as any ―acquisition of
the contents of any . . . electronic . . . communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.‖273 As the court
in Szymuszkiewicz noted, there is no timing requirement written in
the statute.274 The courts applying the narrow reading of
―interception‖ are using an outdated definition that does not make
sense in a modern context.275 Congress should remove this
alternative interpretation so that there is a clear standard to follow.
Clarity is most easily achieved by modifying the ECPA such
that (1) the Wiretap Act covers all situations where a
communication is ―intercepted‖ by an unintended party and (2)
Title II, the SCA, specifically only applies to situations where
individuals access computers or databases they were not supposed
to.276 While this may have been Congress‘s original intent, the
current language is unclear. This change would take the focus off
of the status of a communication when it was intercepted, and put
it more appropriately on the actual harm that resulted. Congress
may have a legitimate reason for keeping the two classes of
communication separate; for instance, hacking to retrieve a stored
record is a different type of intrusion than real-time monitoring is,
and they cause different harms. But, a reformed ECPA need not
sacrifice policing one for the sake of the other.
This proposal, based on the Szymuszkiewicz court‘s suggestion
that the two titles be allowed to overlap277 is beneficial because it
272

See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
274
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705–06.
275
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that courts that follow the narrow
definition of ―intercept‖ that requires it be contemporaneous with transmission generally
look to a particular case, United States v. Turk, which interpreted a different version of
the statute, one that existed before the amendments were made to the ECPA to include
electronic communications).
276
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(―Title II . . . aims to prevent hackers from obtaining, altering or destroying certain stored
electronic communications.‖).
277
See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705.
273
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helps ensure that the ECPA is flexible enough to accommodate
future events. The problem with a mutually exclusive reading,
classifying a given communication as either stored or in
transmission, is that it ignores the possibility of a situation in
which a violation of both titles occurs at the same time. The
Szymuszkiewicz court illustrates a simple example, the VoIP phone
call. For these, the Wiretap Act affords one level of protection
while the SCA affords another.278 A VoIP call, by the nature of its
transmission is stored at the time it is transmitted.279 Allowing
instead for a reading that takes advantage of both provisions would
bring the statute more in line with how technology currently
functions, and produce more consistent results.
New technologies will continue to blur the line between
storage and interception. The fingerprinting of digital devices, a
rapidly growing business, is one such example.280 Under the
existing statute, it is not clear whether the collection of unique,
device-identifying data stored within a computer or mobile phone‘s
memory qualifies as accessing a stored communication or
interception of a transmitted piece of data intended for another
source. Nothing says it cannot be both. As suggested, a standard
that distinguishes between interception and access as classes of
intrusion rather than the status of a communication at the time it is
intercepted has a better chance of adequately addressing the further
harm.
B. Close The Doughnut Hole In The Pen Register Statute
The Pen Register Statute should not apply to location-based
information because the extremely low standard of access it
provides does not reflect the legitimate expectation of privacy an
individual has in his location. Location-based information is
different than the types of non-content information the Pen
Register Statute was intended to control.281 The recording of
278

Id. at 706.
Id.
280
See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Race is on to “Fingerprint”
Phones, PC‟s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646704100959546.html.
281
See Supra Part II.
279
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location-based information is much more intrusive compared to
monitoring the phone numbers an individual dials.282 Knowing
which phone numbers an individual dialed might tell law
enforcement who an individual chose to contact, but it will not
reveal where he was, or what he was doing when he placed the
call.
Cell phone users recognize this distinction and treat the two
kinds of information differently. Even assuming that the Supreme
Court‘s position in Smith v. Maryland283 is correct and users do not
expect any privacy in the phone numbers they dial, the same
assumption cannot be made for location-based information.284 As
already discussed, location-based information is more likely to be
viewed as content by the user, and therefore he will also attach an
expectation of privacy to that information. Thus, whether it be a
check-in on Foursquare or a tagged photograph on Facebook, this
content information falls outside the scope of the Pen Register
Statute, upon a plain reading of its terms, and courts should not
apply additional statutory authority to make it fit.285
There are two possible solutions that will close this doughnut
hole in the statute. First, Congress could completely remove the
―solely pursuant‖ language and thereby limit the Pen Register
Statute to its terms. Alternatively, Congress could specify which
statutes it would allow to be used in conjunction with the Pen
Register Statute, rather than letting the courts or law enforcement
pick and choose the additional statutory authority. Closing the
loophole entirely by restricting the Pen Register Statute to its terms
is the better option in terms of protecting user privacy. It would
bring the statute closer to its original function and allow law
enforcement easy access to a certain, limited class of data, data in

282

See Supra Part III.B.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (explaining that phone numbers
are subject to less protection because ―we doubt that people in general entertain any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.‖).
284
The uproar that occurred when users realized that Apple was storing their location
strongly suggests that users do not believe that they have no expectation of privacy in
their current location. See supra note 9.
285
See supra Part III.B.
283
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which users already have no reasonable expectation of privacy.286
While it is possible that fixing the stored/in transmission
distinction would correct this problem on its own, removing the
loophole by moving protection of location-based data from the
SCA and to the Wiretap Act is the surest way to ensure consistent
results.
C. Require Actual Consent To Each Use
This is one area in which Congress has recognized a problem
and taken action. H.R. 5777, introduced into the House on July 19,
2010, requires companies to disclose their purposes for collecting
user data287 and to obtain user consent for the specific access they
are seeking.288 This bill addresses the ―transferred consent‖
problem that was present in the DoubleClick case,289 and attempts
to solve the problem by enforcing a standard of disclosure about
what is being collected.
However, such a requirement does not address the loopholes
that exist in the current regulation.290 Furthermore, corporations
have already found a way to work around the H.R. 5777
requirements—they classify additional information collected as
non-content data.291 This technique stems from the existing
statutory language of the Pen Register Statute and follows the
rationales of Smith292 and Miller.293 If the information collected by
286
Congress initially drafted the SCA to address only stored communications that were
not generally available to the public. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, Section 201 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3589.
287
See Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility, supra note 271.
288
See id. (―In General- Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f) and section 106, it
shall be unlawful for a covered entity to collect or use covered information about an
individual without the consent of that individual, as set forth in this section.‖).
289
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
290
Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility, supra note 271 (explicitly
not overruling the ECPA).
291
See Foursquare Labs, Inc., Privacy Policy, FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com
/legal/privacy (last updated Jan. 12, 2011) (―Information Collected Automatically: When
you use the Service, foursquare automatically receives and records information on our
server logs from your browser or mobile platform, including your location, IP address,
cookie information, and the page you requested. We treat this data as non-Personal
Information, except where we are required to do otherwise under applicable law.‖
(emphasis added)).
292
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
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location-based mobile services is non-content, or is ―nonpersonal‖294 information, then an individual likely has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data. Once it is disclosed
to the location-based mobile service, non-content information
would be treated like a business record.295 As such, these records
can then be freely disclosed.296
H.R. 5777 does not sufficiently solve the problem of
transferred consent.
In many ways enforcing a consent
requirement hinges on restructuring the ECPA so that a user‘s
location is treated as content information. Content information can
be regulated much more heavily than non-content information
because individuals have a legitimate expectation that the content
of their messages will remain private unless they choose to
disclose it.297 The ECPA provides a clear example of how this
distinction currently applies to law enforcement. The Wiretap Act
regulates access to content and the Pen Register Statute regulates
access to phone numbers, and they create two noticeably different
standards.298
The distinction between content and non-content information is
essential to regulating private businesses as well because it firmly
establishes how information should be treated.
Content
information is more sensitive than non-content information. This
difference is recognized by the ECPA, which subjects the two
classes of information to separate standards.299 It is reasonable to
ask that companies that collect content data acquire consent to do
so, and thereby abide by the ECPA‘s structure. Because users
have the right to assume that their information will not be

293

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (―[R]espondent can assert
neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of the banks.‖).
294
See id.
295
See id.
296
See id. at 443 (―The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.‖ (citing United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971))).
297
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
298
See supra Part II.
299
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848.
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disclosed unless they choose to disclose it,300 users may be willing
to consent to giving these companies content information only if
certain conditions are met.301 However, if a user‘s location is
treated as non-content information, then it falls into the same
category as a telephone number. With no reasonable expectation
of privacy in this non-content information,302 location-based
mobile services do not need to ask for consent or notify the
individual about how they are using that data. This process not
only mischaracterizes how users view their location-based
information, but more importantly, it also distorts how the
location-based mobile services collect and use that information.
D. Treat Location-Based Data More Like Property
Location-based mobile data has many of the same
characteristics of property. It is fixed when it is in storage, it has a
monetary value, and it is sold and traded on a regular basis.303
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, it is used as
consideration in exchange for goods and services.304 Privacy
regulation should recognize the market exchange that is already
taking place between smartphone users and mobile service
providers. This relationship is not the same as the one between an
Internet user and the ad network that collects information and uses
his information to sell advertising. There, the value of user data is
derivative—created by the ad network supplying its service,
banner ad placement, to other companies. Location-based mobile
data, on the other hand, has actual monetary value.305 Companies
encourage users to share their information in exchange for tangible
rewards.306 Whether this is represented by a discount or by free
scoops of ice cream, it is clear that the data collectors are willing to
compensate users for their information. This indicates that

300

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
For example, for safety reasons a user may not want to expose his location to a
mobile service that sells or distributes his information.
302
See supra Part II.
303
See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2011).
304
See supra Part III.B.
305
See supra Part III.B.
306
See id.
301
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location-based user data should be treated differently, and under a
different standard.
Treating data as property in a mobile setting would address the
shortcomings of the ECPA.307 The stored/in transmission issue
would disappear. A statute that recognizes mobile data as
something that resembles property would determine access to that
data based on whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy
at the time it is collected. This new standard would not have to
rely on artificial determinations of a communication‘s status at the
time of interception, but rather would focus on the collection of
data as a type of a seizure. This would create a standard that courts
are familiar with applying and one that will be effective and
relevant as long as mobile data has value.
Furthermore, there would not be any confusion about whether
the Pen Register Statute applies. Conceivably, the public would
object to property being classified as non-content information.
Such a characterization would run counter to existing intellectual
property norms, specifically copyright, which allow users to own
the content of their creations.308 This is not to suggest that user
data should be treated to copyright protection,309 but only suggests
that a recognition that user content is property is not a concept that
is alien to our legal system.
Lastly, treating user data as property would make it clear that
consent is required for third-party access. This logic is more
closely related to preventing a misappropriation of value than it is
in trespass.310 The changes to Foursquare‘s privacy policy,311
highlight the need for this value analysis. If user information is
capable of being exchanged for something, it should be exchanged
at the user‘s discretion. An outside third party with an interest in

307

See supra Part III.
17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2006).
309
See Feist Publ‘ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991) (holding
that copyright protection applies only to the portions of data compilations that are
original to the author and not to mere facts).
310
See Michael A. Carrier, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1485, 1486
(2007) (arguing against creating a right to exclude users from making electronic contact
to their network as one that exceeds traditional property notions).
311
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
308
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collecting that information for free should not be allowed to decide
that it has no value. The value of information should be decided
by negotiations between the two parties. Some academics fear that
any negotiation process would require a complex market for data
exchange.312 This fear, however, is misplaced as informal
negotiations already happen on a daily basis.313 When users decide
that checking-in and sharing their information with Whole Foods is
worth the scoop of gelato offered in exchange, they are
determining the market value of their data.314 With the right
information available, and H.R. 5777 suggests it will be in the
future, users can make more informed choices about what their
information is worth and can choose to share it with those
companies that they feel adequately represent that value.
A conception of mobile privacy that is built on property rights
also correctly accounts for the harm created by the secondary uses
of data. Almost ten years ago, DoubleClick illustrated the dangers
associated with information being sold, collected, and aggregated
by one party.315 Following its billion-dollar acquisition of
consumer records, DoubleClick was in position to compile a
database that accounted for and tracked approximately 90 percent
of the American public.316 Similar efforts today are even more
advanced.317 Users can be tracked not just by their habits but also
by the unique ―fingerprint‖ their device leaves behind wherever
they go. Companies need to be forced to disclose what they are
collecting information for and where that information is going,
beyond their own servers. This argument is again grounded in a
property value-based analysis of personal data. Misrepresenting
contract terms is prohibited, and it follows that misrepresenting the
terms of an information exchange should also be prohibited.
Information is a valuable asset and, as with any transaction, the
312

See Carrier, supra note 310.
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1136 (2000) (arguing that an institutional market infrastructure would not be necessary to
make new property rights in personal information work).
314
See supra Part III.B.
315
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
316
Id.
317
See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 216.
313
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risks associated with that transaction change its value. Consumers
are unable to accurately value the information they are agreeing to
supply when they lack accurate information as to how his
information will be used. Perhaps a check-in at Whole Foods is
worth more than a scoop of gelato. Without an accurate
representation of the risk associated with that disclosure, the
consumer is at a much greater risk of making an unfair deal.318
CONCLUSION
Changes in how users are sharing data have created a need to
update the existing regulations. While proposed legislation
currently in committee addresses some of the issues, it does not go
far enough to close the current loopholes and mischaracterizations
that threaten mobile user privacy. In addition to adopting a new
set of standards regulating data collection, flaws in the ECPA need
to be addressed. By mirroring how users and the industry value
information, the statute could be amended and the current gaps in
the regulation could be closed.

318

H.R. 5777 makes significant progress in this area, particularly through a provision
that allows the FTC to enforce fair commercial practices in data collection. See Building
Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency
Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. §§ 601–
03 (2010).

